"RIPOSTE"

The Pakistan Army has developed a doctrine called the Riposte which is a limited "offensive-defence"^[12] doctrine. It has refined it consistently starting in 1989 during the "Exercise Zarb-e-Momin". This doctrine is fully focused towards Pakistan's archenemy, India.
The doctrine is derived from several factors:^[13]

1. The vulnerability of Pakistan is not in its lack of strategic depth versus India, but in the fact that so many of its major population centers and politically and military sensitive targets lie very close to the border with India. As such Pakistan can ill-afford to lose large territories to an Indian attack.‘
2. Strategic depth’ in the form of a friendly Afghanistan is deemed vital by military planners due to the fact that the country is very narrow at its middle and could well be cut into half by an Indian attack in force.
3. India has substantially enhanced its offensive capabilities, and a stand and fight approach doctrine used in the 1965 and 1971 wars would lead to serious Indian penetration of Pakistani territory with the Pakistani army being unable to maneuver to meet the threat. Counterattacking formations would then be destroyed piecemeal by numerically superior Indian forces.
4. Holding formations in both India and Pakistan can man their forward defensive positions and fortifications in less than 24 hours. However, Corps level reserves with large stockpiles of munitions will take between 24 to 72 hours for mobilization after being given their orders. In this regard, both armies will be evenly matched in the first 24 hours since the Pakistani units have to travel a shorter distance to their forward positions.

This doctrine entails Pakistan in the event of hostilities with India will not wait for the enemy's offensive, but rather launches an offensive of its own. The offensive will be a limited advance along narrow fronts with the aim of occupying territory near the border to a depth of 40–50 km. Since Indian forces will not reach their maximum strength near the border for another 48–72 hours, Pakistan might have parity or numerical superiority against the Indians.
The Pakistani Army hopes to accomplish three things under this strategy:^[13]

1. The enemy is kept off-balance as it will be tied up containing the Pakistani offensive into its territory rather than launching an offensive into Pakistani territory.
2. The Pakistani Army hopes to contain the fighting on the Indian side of the border so that any collateral or other damage will be suffered by India.
3. Indian territory of strategic importance once seized, will give the Pakistani Army a bargaining chip to be used in the aftermath of a ceasefire brought about by international pressure after 3–4 weeks of fighting.

Kashmir, LOC and the Northern Punjab areas are heavily fortified and ill-suited for large mechanized offensives. The most likely area where Pakistan might launch its offensive is the semi-desert and desert sectors in southern Punjab and Sindh provinces.
To supplement this doctrine, the Army in the 1990s created a strong centralized corps of reserves for its formations. The force is known as Army Reserve South and is a grouping of several powerful Corps from Pakistan's Order of Battle. These formations have been rapidly equipped with assets needed for mechanized capability. These reserve formations are dual-capable, meaning they can be used for offensive as well as defensive (holding) purposes. Pakistan has also increased its ammunition, fuel and other military stockpiles to last for 45 days in case of a conflict. During the 1965 war for instance, Pakistan only had 13 day reserves which hampered its military operations.